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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, 
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v. 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah corporation, 
MATTHEW HILTON, BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON 
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah corporation 
MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
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Argument Priority 15 
Case No. 960197-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, p l a i n t i f f and appel lant Samuel L. Boyd ("Boyd") r e p l i e s 
hereby to the defendants ' -appe l lees ' b r i e f s and incorporates the 
arguments se t forth in his appe l l an t ' s br ie f . With respect to 
those new matters ra i sed by defendants and appellees in t h e i r four 
respect ive b r i e f s , Boyd supplements his previous arguments as 
fol lows. l 
lrThe appellees-defendants served four separate b r i e f s on April 10, 1996, 
April 12, 1996, April 15, 1996 and April 19, 1996. Defendants Nielsen and Hilton 
( cont inued . . . ) 
1 
JU THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING BOYD'S 
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE, 
L. THERE IS NO UTAH CASE AFFIRMING A DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 41(b) MERELY UPON A SHOWING OF 
INACTIVITY FOR A PERIOD AS SHORT AS TWENTY-ONE MONTHS. 
INDEED. IN CASES SIMILAR TO THIS ACTION, THIS COURT HAS 
HELD THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION. 
If this Court affirms the trial court's dismissal with 
prejudice of Boyd's claims, its decision will mark a fundamental 
shift in Utah law applying Rule 41(b). In each of the previous 
cases affirming dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b), either 
(1) the plaintiffs failed to comply with court orders or were 
guilty of some dilatory or otherwise culpable conduct, or (2) the 
period of inactivity far exceeded the twenty-one month period at 
issue here. Because neither of these conditions is present here, 
under existing case law, the trial court abused its discretion when 
it dismissed this action with prejudice. That decision should be 
reversed. 
Defendants argue in their briefs that Boyd fails to meet the 
two-part test Utah courts use in analyzing whether to reverse a 
trial court's dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b).2 
1(...continued) 
incorporated by reference the briefs filed by Kirton and Burbidge and by the 
Harmon defendants. Kirton and Burbidge incorporated by reference the Harmon 
defendants' brief. The Harmon defendants "primarily rely on the facts set forth 
by Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell and Brinton R. Burbidge with respect to 
Plaintiff's failure to prosecute" and certain additional facts. Harmon 
defendants' brief at 4. The Harmon defendants, however, have not incorporated 
by reference the arguments of Kirton and Burbidge under Rule 24(h), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the Harmon defendants have not asserted any 
arguments with respect to the trial court's abuse of discretion in dismissing the 
case with prejudice under Rule 41(b). In any case, Boyd files this consolidated 
brief in reply to all of the defendants' briefs. 
2See Charlie Brown Constr. Co. V. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
2 
Defendants argue first that Boyd suffered no injustice, and second, 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the 
case with prejudice under Rule 41(b). Both of these contentions 
miss the mark. 
During all of the proceedings below and on defendants' motions 
for summary affirmance at the Utah Supreme Court,3 defendants have 
failed to cite any Utah case, and Boyd is aware of no Utah case, in 
which any Utah appellate court has affirmed a dismissal with 
prejudice solely on the basis of a period of inactivity which was 
as short as twenty-one months. Although Utah appellate courts have 
affirmed Rule 41(b) dismissals where the period of inactivity was 
as short as two years, the plaintiffs in those cases, without 
exception, had refused or failed to comply with orders of the trial 
court or had engaged in some other affirmative misconduct that 
justified the imposition of the ultimate sanction of dismissal with 
prejudice. See Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (plaintiffs delayed 2 1/2 
years to do discovery, failed to appear pursuant to an order to 
show cause and then waited 8 months before moving to set aside the 
dismissal); Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ. Dept. of 
Agriculture and Applied Science, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)(plaintiffs failed to attend an order to show cause hearing or 
take any action to move their second action along for nearly 2 
years, which delay occurred after a separate trial court previously 
The Utah Supreme Court denied defendants' motions for summary affirmance 
in an order dated December 6, 1995. 
3 
had dismissed the case for failure to prosecute); Maxfield v. 
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App.)/ cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1989)(plaintiff engaged in a series of dilatory actions 
including multiple motions for continuances and other motions after 
the case had been pending for nearly 7 years and the defendants had 
filed a certificate of readiness for trial); Maxfield v. Fishier, 
538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975)(fourteen-month period of inactivity 
coupled with plaintiff's dilatory motion to continue on the day of 
trial because plaintiff still had not retained a crucial medical 
expert) / 
On the other hand, Rule 41(b) dismissals for mere inactivity 
have been affirmed only for periods of complete inactivity far in 
excess of the twenty-one months present here. See Country Meadows 
Convalescent Center v. Department of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993)(more than 5 years). 
Indeed, Utah appellate courts have held, in cases similar to 
the present case, that the trial court abused its discretion by 
dismissing with prejudice. See Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P. 2d 
1368, 1370 (Utah 1977)(dismissal reversed after period of 
inactivity of over 4 years); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul 
W. Larsen Contractors, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) 
(dismissal reversed despite a lack of formal activity of more than 
15 months). 
Fishier subsequently was questioned in Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 136 8 
(Utah 1977), where the Court stated that the trial court should have allowed the 
plaintiff the opportunity to put on his case without the expert. Id. at 1369. 
4 
Thus, under Utah law, a Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice 
constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the plaintiff was guilty 
of failing to comply with court orders or of some other dilatory or 
culpable behavior or the period of inactivity was extraordinarily 
long. The defendants collectively have failed to demonstrate why 
the trial court's Rule 41(b) dismissal would not be an abuse of 
discretion in light of these principles. More importantly, they 
have utterly failed to demonstrate that this case in any way 
warrants a departure from those well-settled principles. 
L. BOYD HAS SUFFERED AN INJUSTICE. 
Boyd complied with all Rules of Civil Procedure, all other 
procedural rules and all court orders in this action.5 Boyd did 
not engage in any type of misconduct that warranted the 
unprecipitated imposition of dismissal with prejudice. 
Additionally, Boyd has sufficiently alleged several claims 
against the defendants that, if proved, would give rise to 
significant amounts of money damages. For example, Boyd has 
alleged that Harmon City mishandled Harmon City's employees' 
pension/ERISA funds before the sale of Harmon City's stock to Boyd 
which resulted in a Consent Judgment being entered in the amount of 
approximately $4,000,000 against Harmon City, Terry Harmon and 
others.6 Defendants' failure to timely disclose this liability, 
5A trial court "retains discretion to dismiss an action 'if a party fails 
to move forward according to the rules and the direction of the court, without 
justifiable excuse.'" Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1215 (emphasis added). 
Record at 396, 123 (Addendum U); Record at 432-33, Answer to Request for 
Admission No. 6 (Addendum V). Record at 670-700 (Addendum W) . The Utah Supreme 
(continued...) 
5 
Boyd further a l l eges , breached the p a r t i e s ' agreements, cons t i tu ted 
s ecu r i t i e s fraud and caused Boyd to unnecessari ly incur s ign i f ican t 
costs and expenses which would not have been incurred had 
defendants properly disclosed Harmon Ci ty ' s mater ia l l i a b i l i t i e s . 
Involuntary dismissal of Boyd's claims ce r t a in ly would prejudice 
Boyd. 
Against t h i s backdrop of prejudice to Boyd, Defendants claim 
tha t they have suffered countervai l ing prejudice which i s "amply 
supported by credible evidence" in the record at 632-635, 647-58. 
Burbidge and Kirton Brief a t 13. The a f f idavi t of Robert Morris, 
Record at 632-635, i s the puta t ive support for the Harmon 
defendants ' claim of pre judice . However, Morris merely claims 
summarily tha t the insurance r a t ing and c red i t r a t ing of Harmon 
City "has been affected", Record a t 633, 515-6, and tha t Harmon 
Ci ty ' s loan appl icat ions "have considered the pending matter" . Id. 
The Morris a f f idav i t omits to s t a t e whether the ra t ings were 
adversely affected and if so, by how much. Therefore, the alleged 
prejudice to the Harmon defendants cannot outweigh the prejudice to 
Boyd if the dismissal i s affirmed. 
Similar ly , defendants c i t e the a f f idav i t of John K. Mangum and 
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s finding tha t the "Court takes jud ic i a l not ice of 
the fact tha t the attorney-Defendants must maintain professional 
6 ( . . . c o n t i n u e d ) 
Court r e c e n t l y ad jud ica ted an appeal involv ing the very same ERISA l i a b i l i t y 
among Harmon Ci ty , Terry Harmon and Nie l sen . See Harmon Ci ty , I n c . v . Nie lsen 
& Senior , 907 P.2d 1162, 1166-67 (Utah 1995). The Court found t h a t ERISA did not 
preempt the s t a t e law claims of the Harmon defendants and o the r s aga in s t Nie lsen 
and t h a t m a t e r i a l i s s u e s of f ac t precluded en t ry of summary judgment in favor of 
Nielsen on Harmon Ci ty , Terry Harmon and o t h e r s ' claims t h a t they had incu r r ed 
ERISA l i a b i l i t y as a r e s u l t of N i e l s e n ' s a l l eged l e g a l m a l p r a c t i c e . .Id. a t 1172. 
6 
liability coverage and insurance" and that the "Court also takes 
judicial notice of the fact that all Defendants must pay attorneys 
to defend them". Findings of Fact 31-32, Record at 717-18. 
However, the trial court's findings are inconsistent with Mangum's 
affidavit which states, "When Nielsen & Senior was served with 
process in this Utah action, Nielsen & Senior decided it would be 
better off, at least for the present, incurring the cost of having 
its own attorneys defend it rather than continue to pay attorney 
fees and legal expenses under its remaining deductible." Record at 
650. Accordingly, while Nielsen alleges that it has incurred 
attorney fees in defending this action, a significant portion of 
those fees were incurred by Nielsen's own attorneys and apparently 
Nielsen's insurer is not involved; both of these facts contained in 
Mangum's affidavit demonstrate that the trial court's findings were 
not supported. Finally, the Kirton and Burbidge defendants have 
not cited any record evidence supporting the trial court's finding 
of prejudice as to them. 
Thus, the trial court's abrupt dismissal of Boyd's claims 
worked a substantial injustice to Boyd -- an injustice that is not 
outweighed by any or all of the inconveniences defendants have 
allegedly endured as a result of the pendency of this action. 
Ci THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES TO MOVE THE CASE ALONG THAT WERE 
LESS HARSH THAN DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, 
Defendants have alleged that Boyd failed to raise the issue of 
whether the trial court failed to use one or more of the several 
tools, including Rule 4-103, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
7 
to move the case forward and police its docket, any of which were 
less drastic than dismissal with prejudice. Kirton and Burbidge 
brief at n.l. However, this issue was raised in Boyd's objection 
to the trial court's ruling. Record at 422-23. Further, 
defendants have alleged that this issue was not included in Boyd's 
statement of issues in his initial brief. Kirton and Burbidge 
brief at n.l. However, issue 3, as stated in Boyd's initial 
brief, provides: "Whether the trial court abused its discretion, 
which abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's 
claims with prejudice despite the availability of numerous 
procedures the trial court should have used to move the case along 
that were less harsh and more equitable than dismissal with 
prejudice." Boyd's Appellant's brief at 3-4. Finally, Boyd raised 
this issue in his docketing statement. See Docketing Statement at 
8, 13. Accordingly, this issue was raised and is properly before 
the Court. 
Kirton and Burbidge further argue that this argument is not 
supported by case authority. However, had a notice pursuant to 
Rule 4-103 been sent by the trial court, Boyd respectfully submits 
that the notice likely would have spurred both parties to action as 
is evidenced by the discovery filed by Boyd after defendants' 
motion to dismiss was filed. See Record at 443-579; Hartford 
Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1994)(failure 
to send plaintiff notice to appoint counsel "would likely have 
spurred Hartford to action, as demonstrated by the plethora of 
legal documents filed by [plaintiff's counsel] concurrent with his 
8 
Notice of Appearance and in response to the State's Motion to 
Dismiss. It would indeed be unjust to deprive Hartford of its day 
in court given the State's failure to provide the required 
notice.") 
IL_ BOYD'S FILING OF A REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND 
DISCOVERY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FILING OF THE RULE 41(B) 
MOTION BY SOME OF THE DEFENDANTS INDICATES THAT DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
In their briefs, the defendants have characterized Boyd's 
filing of a request for scheduling conference under Rule 16 and 
written discovery after the filing of motions to dismiss an "an 
obvious, last-chance attempt to fend off the ensuing dismissal, " 
Kirton and Burbidge Brief at 18, an "eleventh hour attempt to 
invoke the discovery process," id. at 19, a "ruse to avoid 
dismissal," id., and a "mad dash to the Courthouse." Harmon 
defendants brief at 5. To the extent such characterizations imply 
bad faith or some other insidious motive, Boyd categorically 
rejects them as litigation hyperbole devoid of factual foundation. 
But to the extent such statements merely point out that Boya 
took extraordinary efforts to demonstrate to the defendants and the 
trial court his bona fide intentions regarding prosecuting the 
case, Boyd concedes that such was his intent. Nor does Boyd assert 
that the timing of such activity, coming as it did immediately 
after the filing of the attorney defendants' motions to dismiss, 
was coincidental. Nevertheless, responding in such a way cannot 
properly be characterized as conduct that would strengthen the case 
for dismissal with prejudice. To the contrary, the message of that 
activity, and that should have been received by the trial court, 
9 
was tha t Boyd had no in ten t ion of delaying or otherwise abusing the 
jud ic i a l process and was wi l l ing , prepared and going forward. 
The defendants further a sse r t tha t if a p l a i n t i f f were allowed 
to stave off a Rule 41(b) dismissal by taking immediate e f for t s to 
move the case along, "Rule 41(b) would have no meaning." Kirton 
and Burbidge brief a t 19. Not so. Rule 41(b) i s not a r i g i d l y 
defined procedure under which a defendant has a "vested r igh t" to 
dismissal a f te r some a r b i t r a r i l y defined period of i n a c t i v i t y tha t 
the p l a i n t i f f cannot defeat regardless of the circumstances. To 
the contrary, the Rule 41(b) procedure i s f ac t - spec i f i c , case-
sens i t i ve , and can be invoked only upon the t r i a l c o u r t ' s exercise 
of i t s d i sc re t ion upon considerat ion of the p a r t i c u l a r f ac t s . In 
cases such as t h i s , where the predicate for the invocation of Rule 
41(b) can be mere i n a c t i v i t y , a Rule 41(b) procedure i s comparable 
to an order to show cause. In such cases , p l a i n t i f f s cannot be 
faulted for taking a l l avai lable steps to ind ica te to the court 
tha t they are not f a i l i ng and wi l l not f a i l to prosecute the 
matter , if given the opportunity.7 
In response t o Boyd's obse rva t ion t h a t t h e i r j o inde r in the motion t o 
dismiss came a f t e r the per iod of i n a c t i v i t y had ended, the Harmon defendants have 
s t a t e d t h a t " P l a i n t i f f rushed t o the Courthouse t o f i l e a r eques t for schedul ing 
conference" and t h a t the Harmons " jo ined in the Motion one day a f t e r the 
A p p e l l a n t ' s mad dash t o the Courthouse, [and] the Harmons jo ined in the Motion 
before having rece ived anything from the P l a i n t i f f . " Harmon Defendants ' b r i e f 
a t 5, fh . These s ta tements do not a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t the f a c t s and the record 
in t h i s c a s e . The Kir ton and Burbidge defendants f i l e d t h e i r Motion t o Dismiss 
on January 26, 1996. Record a t 297-99. Boyd f i l e d h i s r eques t for schedul ing 
conference on February 9, 1996. Record a t 327-328. Boyd f i l e d h i s oppos i t i on 
memorandum t o the Kir ton and Burbidge Motion on February 9, 1996. Record a t 319-
26. On February 13, 1996, 4 days a f t e r Boyd f i l e d h i s r eques t for schedul ing 
conference and 18 days a f t e r Kir ton and Burbidge f i l e d t h e i r motion, t he Harmon 
defendants f i l e d t h e i r Motion t o Dismiss . Record a t 331. Accordingly, i t i s 
simply not accura te for the Harmon defendants t o a s s e r t t h a t they " jo ined in the 
Motion one day a f t e r A p p e l l a n t ' s mad dash t o t he Courthouse". In any ca se , t he 
( c o n t i n u e d . . . ) 
10 
E. THE PARTIES HAD SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS TWELVE MONTHS 
BEFORE THE TIME DEFENDANTS FILED THEIR MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS. 
Boyd respectfully submits that the trial court's finding that 
there were no settlement discussions was not supported.8 Indeed, 
Boyd further submits that the trial court erred by summarily 
rejecting the Jones' affidavit on a motion to dismiss, particularly 
where the Jones' affidavit shows the existence of the settlement 
negotiations by the parties. In light of such settlement 
discussions which occurred twelve months before the filing of a 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, Boyd submits that it 
was improper for the trial court to dismiss Boyd's claims with 
prejudice. 
Defendants further argue that Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P. 2d 
1135, 1137 (Utah 1977), and its reversal of a dismissal under Ruld 
41(b), is distinguishable. Defendants argue that in Utah Oil there 
had been some activity initiated by plaintiff in the case before 
the inactivity and subsequent dismissal. However, defendants cite 
no language from Utah Oil which supports this argument. 
II- THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF BOYD'S FOURTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT SHOULD 
BE REVERSED. 
In reply to the defendants' arguments regarding the Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal of Boyd's fourth cause of action for damages 
7( ...continued) 
Harmon defendants have not explained why, given filing of their Rule 41(b) motion 
after the period of inactivity had ended, they were entitled to dismissal even 
if the dismissal as to the other defendants is affirmed. 
8See Finding of Fact 119, Record at 716, Record at 804-805, 812-13 
(Addendum Y at 7-8, 15-16); 393-94, 17 (Addendum U); 400, f4(Addendum X). 
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under the Utah Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 et seq. 
(the "Act"), Boyd supplements Section II of Appellant's brief as 
follows. 
A,. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULE 41(B) DISMISSAL DOES NOT DEPRIVE 
BOYD OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL 
OF HIS SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIM. 
The defendants argue that this Court should refuse to consider 
Boyd's appeal regarding the securities fraud claim if this Court 
agrees that the Rule 41(b) dismissal was entered properly. Kirton 
and Burbidge brief at 22-24. Assuming, as the defendants have 
asserted, that the Rule 41(b) dismissal "operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits of the case," id. at 24, such an 
adjudication would finalize the trial court's disposition of the 
case, entitling Boyd to appeal both from the interlocutory Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal of the securities fraud claim as well as the 
Rule 41(b) dismissal. It would not legally operate as a bar to 
Boyd's appeal of earlier decisions of the trial court regarding 
interlocutory matters. 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure grants to 
district court litigants the right to appeal "from all final orders 
and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law." Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in turn, specifies that 
when more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action . . . the court may direct the entry of a final 
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims . . . only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims, and the 
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order or other form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of the parties. 
(Emphasis added). 
In this case, the trial court did not make a Rule 54(b) 
determination about the dismissal of the securities fraud claim. 
Therefore, under Rule 54(b), that decision was not a final judgment 
from which Boyd earlier could have appealed. In fact, and assuming 
the Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice was properly entered, it 
was not until after the time of that dismissal that any aspect of 
the case would have been ripe for appeal. 
Notwithstanding these procedural constraints, the defendants 
argue that the very same Rule 41(b) dismissal that gave rise to 
Boyd's appeal of right simultaneously barred it. The procedural 
rules do not, however, place Boyd in such an inequitable quandary; 
nor do (or could) defendants assert that this Court is without 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
The cases cited by the defendants do not stand for the 
proposition that a Rule 41(b) dismissal of Boyd's claims, even if 
affirmed by this Court, would justify this Court in forfeiting 
Boyd's right to appeal from prior, interlocutory rulings. 
First, in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989), 
the court held that, in light of its affirmance of a Rule 41(b) 
dismissal, it did not need to address the plaintiff's claim that 
the trial court had erred in denying a motion for summary judgment. 
Id. at 241. However, by the time of the Rule 41(b) ruling in that 
action, the plaintiff already had unsuccessfully tried to appeal 
from the denial of a summary judgment motion. id. at 239-240. 
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This important opportunity Boyd has not yet had. More importantly, 
the dismissal was entered sua sponte on the eve of a trial date 
that already had been postponed several times by the plaintiff and 
after nearly a decade of dilatory conduct by plaintiff that rose to 
the level of "abuse of the judicial process." id. at 241. Boyd 
has been guilty of no such dilatory conduct and should not be 
penalized additionally by losing his right to appeal the dismissal 
of the securities fraud claim. 
Second, in Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584 
(Utah App. 1990), the Court of Appeals affirmed an order of 
dismissal under Rule 37(d) as a sanction for failure to respond to 
discovery requests and, given that decision, declined to consider 
the plaintiffs' appeal from a grant of summary judgment for the 
defendants. .Id. at 587. No Rule 41(b) dismissal was involved in 
Schoney. More importantly, Schoney is inapplicable because the 
defendant had simultaneously moved for summary judgment and for 
dismissal under Rule 37(d). Therefore, as the court correctly 
observed, because the dismissal under Rule 37(b) was "sufficient, 
by itself, to dispose of the case," the propriety of the summary 
judgment motion was not addressed. Id.. In the present case, the 
dismissal under Rule 41(b) followed the dismissal of the securities 
fraud claim by 2 years and could not conceivably be an alternate, 
contemporaneous adjudication of the securities fraud issue. 
Finally, Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Department of 
Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah App. 1993), is inapposite. There, the 
court affirmed a Rule 41(b) dismissal that followed a five-year 
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period of inactivity and therefore declined to consider the trial 
court's treatment of a summary judgment motion. Xd. at 1217. 
Importantly, however, the motion for summary judgment from which 
the plaintiff appealed had been filed several weeks after the 
motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b). Jd. at 1214. Here, the trial 
court's dismissal of the securities fraud claim preceded the Rule 
41(b) motion by about two years. 
Applicable court rules precluded Boyd from taking an 
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's dismissal of his 
securities fraud claim until final judgment was entered. It is 
grossly unfair to suggest, as Defendants do, that having received 
final judgment in the form of a Rule 41(b) dismissal, Boyd's right 
to appeal the dismissal of the securities fraud claim now has been 
lost solely because of the procedural form of that final judgment. 
B^ BOYD HAS STANDING UNDER THE ACT. 
This Court recently has held that "[p]otential purchasers or 
mere offerees do not have a cause of action" under the Act. Levitz 
v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Relying 
on Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), this 
Court determined that, to have standing under the Act, the 
plaintiff must be an "actual purchaser." id. at 1247. 
In order to be an "actual purchaser," however, a party need 
not have legal title to securities or even consummate a sale of 
securities. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Blue 
Chip Stamps that even an executory contract pertaining to the sale 
of securities will grant standing under Rule 10b-5 under the 
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 421 U.S. at 748. This majority 
view has been acknowledged by this Court. Levitz, 877 P. 2d at 1247 
n. 5. 
Apparently accepting tha t an executory contract for the 
purchase of s ecu r i t i e s wi l l grant standing under the Act, the 
Defendants a sse r t tha t Boyd did not a l lege "that an actual contract 
to purchase was entered." Harmon defendants ' br ief a t 11. This 
asser t ion i s simply inconsis tent with the record. At paragraph 16 
of his Amended Complaint, Boyd alleged as follows: 
In the l a t e spring of 1986, NINI [Boyd's predecessor in 
i n t e r e s t ] was induced . . . to enter in to an agreement 
by which NINI would purchase 100% of the common stock of 
Harmon City from Harmon Ci ty ' s shareholders in order to 
obtain the asse ts and operations of the harmon City 
grocery chain. A l e t t e r agreement was executed. 
R. a t 12. By t h i s paragraph, Boyd c l ea r ly alleged the existence of 
an executory contract for the purchase of shares of Harmon City. 
And despi te the defendants ' present p r o t e s t a t i o n s , in considering 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) , the t r i a l court was 
obligated to accept the facts as al leged in the Amended Complaint. 
Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
Accordingly, for purposes of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ana lys i s , Boyd was 
an "actual purchaser" for purposes of the Act.9 
9Even were the Court , applying the app rop r i a t e s tandard of review, able t o 
cons ider t h a t t he p a r t i e s p r e s e n t l y d i spu t e the l e g a l e f f e c t of t he l e t t e r 
agreement p e r t a i n i n g t o the s e c u r i t i e s purchase , t h a t l e g a l u n c e r t a i n t y would not 
prec lude a c t u a l purchaser s t a t u s . See, e . g . , Mullen v . Sweetwater Dev. Corp . , 
619 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo. 1985) ("To exclude a c o n t r a c t t o purchase s tock 
on the ground t h a t i t s e n f o r c e a b i l i t y i s d i spu ted would al low a pa r t y t o de fea t 
any claim a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t i t merely by cha l l eng ing the v a l i d i t y of the 
c o n t r a c t " ) . 
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Additionally, the Birnbaum rule, as Defendants have referred 
to it, is not mechanically applied such that a plaintiff will never 
have standing to bring a securities fraud case unless there has 
been consideration paid and received and share certificates issued. 
For example, in Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989), a 
case featured in the Harmon defendants' brief, the court held that 
the plaintiff had standing to bring a Rule 10b-5 claim even though 
he personally had not purchased any securities. id. at 1161-62. 
In Grubb, the plaintiff, a natural person, borrowed money to 
organize and capitalize a holding company that then purchased a 
third-party bank in reliance on representations of the defendant 
bank. Because of the incurrence of this obligation, the plaintiff 
was the "actual party at risk in the transaction." id. at 1161. 
Moreover, the policy concerns animating the Birnbaum rule, 
specifically (i) the desire not to allow "mere bystanders to a 
securities transaction" a cause of action, and (ii) the desire to 
avoid speculative and conjectural evidence, were not implicated. 
Id. at 1161-62; see also Banco Nacional De Costa Rica v. Bremar 
Holdings Corp., 492 F. Supp. 364, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Birnbaum 
rule did not bar claim by guarantor of notes from asserting 
securities fraud claim against maker of notes even though it 
technically purchased no securities; claim nevertheless was based 
on a "concrete" transaction resulting in damages capable of precise 
calculation). 
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C. UNDER THE ACT, BOYD MAY RECOVER THE OUT-OF-POCKET LOSSES 
HE SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENDANTS' VIOLATION OF 
THE ACT. 
Upon a showing that a defendant has violated the Act, the Act 
specifies that the plaintiff may "sue either at law or in equity to 
recover the consideration paid for the security" together with 
statutory interest, costs and legal fees less the amount of any 
income derived from the securities. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
22(1)(a). This provision does not purport, however, to be an 
exhaustive and exclusive list of remedies available for violation 
of the Act. Nor have Utah courts so construed it. 
As the Defendants have explained, the Act "must be interpreted 
and administered consistently 'with the federal regulation.'" 
Harmon defendants' brief at 10 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27). 
Under federal law, one of the types of damages recoverable upon a 
showing of a violation of Rule 10b-5 is consequential or incidental 
damages. See, e.g., Zeller v. Boaue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 
795, 803 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.) (consequential damages are 
recoverable under the Exchange Act if plaintiff "establish[es] the 
causal nexus with a good deal of certainty"), cert, denied, 414 
U.S. 908 (1973); Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d at 1162 (awarding damages 
under Rule 10b-5 based not on value of securities but on 
plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses). 
Given the similarities between Section 61-1-22 of the Act and 
Rule 10b-5, and in light of the foregoing authorities, Boyd should 
be allowed to recover the amounts he spent in reliance in the 
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representations of the Defendants in connection with the agreement 
for the sale of the Harmon City Stock. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants have failed to demonstrate that a fundamental 
and significant shift in Utah law pertaining to Rule 41(b) is 
warranted in these circumstances. Under existing law, the trial 
court abused its discretion by dismissing with prejudice Boyd's 
claims solely upon the basis of a 21-month period of inactivity. 
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that dismissal with 
prejudice is a harsh and permanent result that should be 
disfavored. This case is uniquely ill-suited for the application 
of that harsh procedure. Additionally, the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in concluding that Boyd had failed to state a claim 
under the Utah Securities Act. 
In light of the foregoing, Boyd respectfully requests that the 
Court reverse the trial court's decision to dismiss Boyd's claims 
with prejudice and remand to the trial court for additional 
proceedings. 
DATED this 22nd day of May, 1996. 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAFl 
Je'f'frey M. Jones 
J/Mark Gibb 
Attorneys for Samuel L. Boyd 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of May, 1996, I caused 
two copies of the foregoing to be mailed in the U.S. Mail, first-
class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake T. Ostler 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendants Harmon City, Inc. 
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon 
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas L. Kay 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorney for Defendants Kirton and Burbidge 
111 East Broadway #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Glenn C. Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorney for Defendant Matthew Hilton 
600 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
jmg/boydre.br f 
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ADDENDA 
In addition to the Addenda A-Z previously attached to the 
Appellant's Brief, Boyd attaches the following for the 
convenience of the Court: 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Addendum 1 
Rule 10b-5, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Addendum 2 
Section 61-1-22, -28 Addendum 3 
facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the 
claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits 
shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered 
by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient perfor-
mance. A response shall be filed within 20 days after the 
motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the 
response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. Upon consideration of the motion, 
affidavits, and memoranda, the court may order that the case 
be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the purpose of 
entering findings of fact relevant to the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that 
the attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest 
upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw 
and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or 
retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for 
briefs shall be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand 
under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these 
rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay 
is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the 
parties or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand 
the trial court shall conduct hearings and take evidence as 
necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidentiary 
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as 
practicable after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be 
upon the proponent of the fact The standard of proof shall be 
a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter 
written findings of fact. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the 
conclusion of all proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of 
the tria) court and the court reporter shaB prepare the record 
of the supplemental proceedings as required by these rules. If 
the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has 
been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemen-
tal proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record. 
If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court 
has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of 
the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental 
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the 
record from the trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify 
the parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument 
under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made during 
the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors 
in other appeals. The findings of fact entered pursuant to this 
rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of 
findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1,1992.) 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Briefofthe appellant The briefofthe appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indi-
cated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal 
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the 
addendum, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically 
arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and 
other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the 
brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, 
including for each issue, the standard of appellate review 
with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue 
was preserved in the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determina-
tive of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal 
shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If 
the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation 
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an 
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references 
to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of argu-
ments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct conden-
sation of the arguments actually made in the body of the 
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading 
under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the con-
tentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief 
sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no 
addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The adden-
dum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so 
makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of 
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or 
regulation of central importance cited in the brief but 
not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) any court opinion of central importance to the 
appeal but not available to the court as part of a 
regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of 
central importance to the determination of the ap-
peal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, 
the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the 
contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the 
appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appel-
lant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not in-
cluded in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee 
may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to 
the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-
appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response 
of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. 
Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set 
forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (aX2), (3), (9), and 
Addendum l 
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(10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with 
leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be 
expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to ^ 
minimum references to parties by such designations as aap^ 
pellant" and "appellee.* It promotes clarity to use the designa^ 
tions used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or 
the actua/names orparties, or descriptive terms sucn as itfe 
employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall 
be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursue 
ant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits shall be made 
to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the 
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be 
kmade to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, 
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefe 
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the 
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross, 
appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, 
unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer 
to the brief of the appellant. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or 
appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or 
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the 
appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant </r appellee may adapt byrefe&ace any part at 
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs, 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When perti-
nent and significant authorities come to the attention of a 
party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral 
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the 
Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be 
filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either 
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state 
the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall 
be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited, 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this 
rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically ar-
ranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on 
motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy 
cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.) 
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad 
litem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem 
representing a minor who is not a party to the appeal may be 
filed only if accompanied by written consent of all parties, or 
by leave of court granted on motion or at the request of the 
.court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of the 
Applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as all 
parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or guardian ad 
litem shall file its brief within the time allowed the party 
whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae 
or guardian ad litem will support, unless the court for cause 
shown otherwise orders. A motion of an amicus cunae or 
guardian ad litem to participate in the oral argument will be 
granted when circumstances warrant in the court's discretion. 
Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs. 
(a) Time for serving and filing briefs. The appellant 
shall serve and die a brief within 40 days after date of no dice 
from the clerk of the appellate court pursuant to Rule 13, 
unless a motion for summary disposition of the appeal or ^ 
motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance of 
counsel has been previously interposed, in which event service 
and filing shall be within 30 days from the denial of such 
motion. The appellee shall serve and file a brief within 30 days 
after service of the appellant's brief. A reply brief may be 
served and filed by the appellant. If a reply brief is filed, it 
shall be served and filed within 30 days after the filing and 
service of the appellee's brief. If oral argument is scheduled 
fewer than 35 days after the filing of appellee's brief, the reply 
brief must be filed at least 5 days prior to oral argument. By 
stipulation filed with the court, the parties may extend each of 
such periods for no more than 30 days in civil cases or 15 days 
in criminal cases. A motion for enlargement of time need not 
accompany the stipulation. No such stipulation shall be effec> 
tive unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the period 
sought to be extended. 
(b) Number of copies to be filed and served. For mat. 
ters pending in the Supreme Court, ten copies of each brief, 
one of which shall contain an original signature, shall be filed 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. For matters pending it\ 
the Court of Appeals, eight copies of each brief, one of which 
shall contain an original signature, shall be filed with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Two copies shall be served or* 
counsel for each party separately represented. 
(c) Consequence of failure to file briefs. If an appellant 
fails to file a brief within the time provided in this rule, or 
within the time as may be extended by order of the appellate 
court, an appellee may move for dismissal of the appeal. If an 
appellee fails to file a brief within the time provided by this, 
rule, or within the time as may be extended by order of the 
appellate court, an appellant may move that the appellee not 
be heard at oral argument. 
(d) Return of record to the clerk. Each party, upon the 
filing of its brief, shall return the record to the clerk of the 
court having custody pursuant to these rules. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.) 
Rule 27. Form of briefs. 
(a) Paper size; printing and spacing. Briefs shall be 
typewritten, printed or prepared by photocopying or othe* 
duplicating or copying process that will produce clear, blacl^ 
and permanent copies equally legible to printing, in type not; 
smaller than ten characters per inch, on opaque, unglazed 
paper 8 Vi inches wide and 11 inches long, and shall be 
securely bound along the left margin. Paper may be recycled 
paper, with or without deinking. The impression must be 
double spaced, except for matter customarily single spaced 
and indented, with adequate margins on the top and sides of 
each page. 
(b) Binding. Briefs shall be printed on both sides of the 
page, and bound with a compact-type binding so as not unduly 
to increase the thickness of the brief along the bound side. 
Coiled plastic and spiral-type bindings are not acceptable. 
(c) Color of cover; contents of cover. The cover of the 
brief of appellant shall be blue; that of appellee, red; that or 
intervenor, guardian ad litem, or amicus curiae, green; that or 
any reply brief, gray; that of any petition for rehearing, tan-
that of any response to a petition for rehearing, white; that or 
a petition for certiorari, white; that of a response to a petition 
for certiorari, orange; and that of a reply to the response to a 
SEC Rule 10b-5 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 [Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices] 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security. 
Addendum 2 
61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation — Remedies 
— Limitation of actions. 
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of 
Subsection 61-1-3(1), Section 61-1-7, Subsection 61-1-
17(2), any rule or order under Section 61-1-15, which 
requires the affirmative approval of sales literature before 
it is used, any condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-
10(4) or 61-1-11(7), or offers, sells, or purchases a security 
in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is liable to the person 
selling the security to or buying the security from him, 
who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the 
consideration paid for the security, together with interest 
at 12% per year from the date of payment, costs, and 
reasonable attorney's fees, less the amount of any income 
received on the security, upon the tender of the security or 
for damages if he no longer owns the security. 
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable 
upon a tender less the value of the security when the 
buyer disposed of it and interest at 12% per year from the 
date of disposition. 
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection (1) may 
award an amount equal to three times the consideration paid 
for the security, together with interest, costs, and attorney's 
fees, less any amounts, all as specified in Subsection (1) upon 
a showing that the violation was reckless or intentional 
(3) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of 
Subsection 61-1-1(2) is not liable under Subsection dXa) if the 
purchaser knew of the untruth or omission, or the seller did 
not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known of the untrue statement or misleading omission. 
(4) (a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a 
seller or buyer liable under Subsection (1), every partner, 
officer, or director of such a seller or buyer, every person 
occupying a similar status or performing similar func-
tions, every employee of such a seller or buyer who 
materially aids in the sale or purchase, and every broker-
dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also 
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as 
the seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or 
nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the burden of proof 
that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by 
reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
(b) There is contribution as in cases of contract among 
the several persons so liable. 
(5) Any tender specified in this section may be made at any 
time before entry of judgment. 
(6) A cause of action under this section survives the death of 
any person who might have been a plaintiff or defendant. 
(7) (a) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liabil-
ity under this section unless brought before the expiration 
of four years after the act or transaction constituting the 
violation or the expiration of two years after the discovery 
by the plaintiff of the facts constituting the violation, 
whichever expires first. 
(b) No person may sue under this section if: 
(i) the buyer or seller received a written offer, 
before suit and at a time when he owned the security, 
to refund the consideration paid together with inter-
est at 12% per year from the date of payment, less the 
amount of any income received on the security, and he 
failed to accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt; 
or 
(ii) the buyer or seller received such an offer before 
suit and at a time when he did not own the security, 
unless he rejected the offer in writing within 30 days 
of its receipt. 
(8) No person who has made or engaged in the performance 
of any contract in violation of this chapter or any rule or order 
hereunder, or who has acquired any purported right under any 
such contract with knowledge of the facts by reason of which 
its making or performance was in violation, may base any suit 
on the contract. 
(9) A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person 
acquiring a security to waive compliance with this chapter or 
a rule or order hereunder is void. 
(10) (a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter 
are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may 
exist at law or in equity. 
(b) This chapter does not create any cause of action not 
specified in this section or Subsection 61-1-4(5). m i 
Addendum 3 
61-1-27. Construction of chapter. 
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of 
this chapter with the related federal regulation. 1983 
